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IS THE COMMISSIONER'S AUTHORITY
EXCEEDED IN THE PROPOSED
REGULATIONS FOR PROFESSIONAL
FIRMS?
Louis MAIER* AND Rocia CARTER**
Practice under annotated statutes may have dulled lawyers' percep-
tion of their historical role in the development of the law. It is easy
to forget that the great principles of common law were developed from
the opposing contentions of lawyers in presenting their clients' cases
to judges for determination. The growth of such a large body of
statutory law has eliminated to a large extent the active part of the
lawyer in the development of new legal principles not involved in the
construction of statutes. Consequently, lawyers tend to take a more
passive role in the law-making process. We accept the statutes as they
are passed and only occasionally question their constitutionality. This
is evident in the attitude of many attorneys to the proposed regulations
under section 7701 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 relating to
professional corporations and associations, their reactions being outrage
rather than attempts to get judicial correction thereof.'
For example, in Commerce Clearing House's Pension Plan Guide
it is stated:
In a statement from the American Bar Association it was noted
that the Association is actively engaged in activities to bring about
tax treatment for retirement plans of professional people which
is similar to that offered to corporate employees under a qualified
plan. The statement said that the question of professional cor-
poration is one for individual states and the ABA has taken no
official position with regard to them. Also, the Association has
taken no official position with regard to the proposed regulations
under Section 7701 (a), but the statement said that 'the proposed
Internal Revenue Service regulations would make it virtually
impossible for professipnal corporations to qualify as a corpora-
tion for Federal tax purposes.'2 (Emphasis added.)
The thesis of this paper is that it is not the regulations that deter-
mine the tax status of any organization. As so pointedly stated several
years ago by John Connolly, former secretary and general counsel for
*B.S.B.A., Marquette University (1936); LL.B., University of Wisconsin
(1939); vice-chairman, Tax Section, Wisconsin Bar Association; formerly
chairman, Tax Section, Milwaukee Bar Association; member, Wisconsin
and Minnesota bars.
**LL.B., Marquette University (1964); clerk for Judge Grubb, United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin; member, Wisconsin
bar.
'CCH 1964 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 5 8872-73.
2 COMMERCE CLEARING HousE, PENSION PLAN GuIDE, No. 37, pt. 1 (1964).
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Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company, in an income tax
class, "the regulations are only the Commissioner's opinion of what the
law is." Too many of us accept the regulations without question. In
a way, this is an acknowledgement of the good job which the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue has generally done; however, this
does not mean that he is correct here. In fact, the long time between
announcement of their planning and their publication could indicate
a strong internal diVision of opinion on the subject among the Com-
missioner's staff. Very likely, the opinions of various staff members
can be represented by several different viewpoints.
Undoubtedly, several of the staff agree with the position set out by
Professor Boris I. Bittker in his article, "Professional Associations and
Federal Income Taxation: Some Questions and Comments."3 In that
article, Professor Bittker is frank to indicate his bias in favor of na-
tional action rather than state action. He expresses a fear of state
activity that is parallel to the "1942-1948 Community Property Syn-
drome," where several states enacted community property laws to
achieve tax equality with the community property states.
Others may object to the new form of professional organization,
largely on traditional grounds. For example, many attorneys have ex-
pressed the opinion, based on ethical grounds, that no law firm should
be allowed to incorporate.
However, these differing opinions are not really the issue. The issue
is: Are the proposed regulations in conformity with the Internal Reve-
nue Code and the court decisions under it?
Provisions of the Propased Regulations in Respect to
Professional Corporations
The proposed amendments to the regulations deal with the classi-
fication of associations for tax purposes. They set forth specific stand-
ards that must be met in order that professional service organizations
will receive corporate tax treatment from the Commissioner. They
define a professional service organization as "an organization formed
by one or more persons to engage in a business involving the perform-
ance of professional services for profit which, under local law, may
not be organized and operated in the form of an ordinary business cor-
poration having all the usual characteristics of such corporation." 4 This
definition is used regardless of the denomination of the organization
under applicable state law. The proposed regulations justify this special
consideration of the professional service corporation on the alleged
inherent difference between such a corporation and the familiar type
of business corporation when viewed from the standpoint of the rela-
317 TAx L. REv. 1 (1961).
4Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (1) (i).
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tionships of the members of the organization to each other and of the
members to clients or patients and to the public.5
In order for a professional service organization to receive corporate
tax treatment, it must be found to possess certain characteristics of the
ordinary business corporation. The proposed rules for determining
when an organization has the characteristics of continuity of life, cen-
tralization of management, limited liability, and free transferability of
interest are set out.e These differ considerably from the concepts de-
fined in the "old" Kintner regulations-
Continuity of Life. The proposed regulations deny continuity of
life where a member's right to share in the profits is contingent upon
being actively employed in the production of income. They further state
that the required sale of ownership interest upon termination of the
employment relationship also indicates lack of continuity of life.7 These
are novel concepts in the fields of corporate and tax law. If these ideas
were applied to any corporation where capital was not a material in-
come producing factor, a very great number of small corporations
whose corporate status has, up to now, never been questioned would
fail to meet the test. The Commissioner's proposed regulations at-
tempt to make a distinction between characteristics imposed by agree-
ment of the parties and characteristics imposed by statute. Laymen will
have a hard time appreciating the difference, especially after an ambi-
tious revenue agent starts questioning a corporation's corporate tax
status on this ground. The regulation's statement that this type of con-
tinuity of existence is essentially different from the continuity of ex-
istence of an ordinary business corporation is not consistent with actual
situations that exist in a great many instances. Very frequently, lawyers
are called upon to draft, for small "ordinary business" corporations,
agreements that provide for stock repurchase upon termination of em-
ployment. Could it be that the only experience in this field on the part
of some of the young men on the Commissioner's staff has been with
the large corporations whose problems are frequently dealt with in the
case books which only touch upon the practices followed in the cases
of the many small closely owned corporations?
Centralized Management. Here the proposed regulations" require
that the managers have exclusive authority to do all of the following:
retain and discharge members and employees; determine salaries and
other conditions of employment; select those to whom services will
be rendered; assign cases or matters to members and employees; set
the procedure for each case; establish fees to be charged; determine na-
ture, use, and disposition of the organization's records; and authorize
5 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (h) (1) (ii).
G Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2.
7 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (h) (2).
8 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (h) (3).
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distribution of earnings. With the exception of the last, these are simi-
lar to the usual attributes of corporations. The authorization for dis-
tribution of earnings in all corporations is made by the directors as
such, and not by the managers as such. There is a real difference be-
tween the two capacities. As a matter of practice, there is just about
the same amount and kind of centralized management in partnerships
with more than two bona-fide partners as there is in small closely
owned corporations. A more accurate statement of the rule is made in
the private ruling given to the Old Colony Medical Group of Meridian,
Connecticut in 1961. 9 There, the Commissioner did find sufficient cor-
porate characteristics and an employment relationship such as to cause
the corporation to be taxed as a corporation and be required to withhold
taxes on wages of shareholder employees.
Limited Liability. The proposed regulation's statement that the pro-
fessional service organization does not possess the characteristic of
limited liability if the members' personal liability is greater than a
shareholder-employee of an "ordinary business" corporation ° is con-
fusing at best. By inference it seems to preclude the forms of liability
that attached to shareholders of many "ordinary business" corporations,
such as double liability in the case of banks and for wages earned
within a limited period before termination of business.
Free Transferability of Interests. The proposed regulations state
that the characteristic of free transferability of interest is not present
in the typical professional organizations, since the right of the member
to share profits of the organization is contingent upon the existence of
an employment relationship.' The proposed regulation distinguishes
the right of first refusal in connection with the transfer of an interest
in an "ordinary business" corporation where such right applies only
to the profits and assets of the enterprise, from the professional service
organization where it applies as well to the right to the employment
relationship. They contend that in a professional organization the right
to share profits is contingent upon continuing employment." These are
mere words, as there is hardly a small corporation where profits are
distributed other than as a part of compensation.
Proposed Regulations Go Beyond
Existing Case Law
The validity of the proposed additions to the regulations must be
tested in the light of their conformity to existing law. In this testing,
the doctrine of congressional acquiescence must be considered. It is an
9 CCH 1961 STAND. FED. TAX REP. § 6635.
10 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (h) (4).
"1 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (h) (5) (i).
12 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (h) (5) (ii).
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established rule that if Congress reenacts a statute without substantial
change, there is a sound indication that previous judicial interpreta-
tions of the statute are approved by Congress. 13 Consequently, the pro-
posed regulations must be examined for conformity with judicial in-
terpretations.
There are actually two types of regulations: legislative and inter-
pretive. Legislative regulations are made pursuant to a specific delega-
tion of legislative power which set out the standards to be applied in
drafting the regulations. Here, we are concerned rather with inter-
pretive regulations. If the Treasury's interpretation of the statute has
received legislative approval, its interpretation has become fixed in the
statute and the Treasury should have no more power to change the
regulation than to change the wording of the statute itself.' 4 Therefore,
since section 7701(a) (3) of the 1954 Code is identical with section
3797(a) (3) of the 1939 Code, the Treasury has no authority to change
the regulations. It is our contention that the proposed regulations do
attempt to change the law, and that where this is attempted they are
invalid.
The best way to determine the validity of the newly proposed regu-
lations is to test them against the law: statutory, court decisions, and
the old regulations which have the authority of implied adoption by
Congress.
The statute under both the 1954 and 1939 Internal Revenue Codes
is identical except for section numbering. The court decisions have been
reviewed so many times that another summary hardly seems necessary.
However, the Commissioner's proposed regulations are so much at vari-
ance with the court decisions that a further examination of the funda-
mental cases is necessary.
Judicial Construction of the Statute
The United States Supreme Court has set out the principal char-
acteristics that determine whether or not an organization is taxable as
a corporation in Morrissey v. Commissioner.5 In this case, the indi-
viduals involved entered into a declaration of trust and transferred
certain real estate to the trustees. The trustees sold some of this land
and improved the remainder by development of a golf course. This was
sold to Western National Golf Club, Inc., in exchange for its stock.
Thereafter, the trustees confined their activities primarily to the col-
lection of moneys due and the making of distributions to beneficiaries.
Under the trust agreement, the trustees have the power of sale, to make
investments, and generally to manage the trust estate. They could
"3Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 (1946).
4 Alvord, Treasury Regulations and the Wilshire Oil Case, 40 COLUM. L. REv.
252 (1940).
15 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
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choose their own successors and add to their number. Beneficial interest
in the trust was evidenced by transferable certificates, but the certifi-
cate holders' votes were advisory only. The trustees had no power to
bind the beneficiaries personally by any act, neglect, or default, and the
death of a beneficiary or a trustee did not end the trust.
The trustees claimed that this organization was a trust taxable under
section 219 of the 1924 and 1926 Revenue Acts, principally because the
beneficiaries had no voice in the management, or control over the trus-
tees. In view of the Commissioner's position of attempting to deny cor-
porate status to professional service organizations in the proposed regu-
lations, it is ironic to note that here it was the Commissioner who was
asserting that the organization must be taxed as a corporation. It can
be explained that the Commissioner is perfectly consistent in both cases.
His sole aim in both actions appears to favor the increase in revenue
regardless of whether the application of legal principles is consistent.
The United States Supreme Court upheld the Commissioner in
Morrissey. Consequently, it is most difficult to understand how the
Court could uphold the proposed regulations without overruling Mor-
risey. Simple justice and sound public policy of comparable equal treat-
ment of taxpayers similarly situated should dictate that the Court up-
hold its previous position. The Court held in Morrissey that the trust
had enough corporate characteristics to be taxable as such. The opinion
pointed out that the beneficiaries had planned a common effort and en-
tered into a combination for the conduct of a business enterprise. Con-
sequently, it was distinguishable from an ordinary trust.
In its opinion, the Court set out the principal characteristics of a
corporation, which, if present in an organization, would be sufficient to
require that it be taxed as a corporation. 16 These may be summarized
as follows:
1. Associates.
2. Purpose of entering into a joint enterprise for transacting
business.
3. Title to property held in the name of the entity and not the
beneficiaries as individuals.
4. Centralized management.
5. Continuity of life irrespective of continuing membership or
ownership by owners.
6. Limited liability.
7. Transferability of interests without affecting continuity of life
of the enterprise.
The problem does not come from failure to recognize these charac-
teristics on the Commissioner's part. He has included all but the title
characteristic in his regulations issued under the 1939 Code17 as well as
16 Id. at 359-60.
'T Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.3797.
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under the 1954 CodeS--the popularly designated Kintner regulations.
The difficulty arises from the Commissioner's application and detailed
interpretation of these principles.
In Morrissey and its companion cases,19 the Court pointed out that
certain features usually found in corporations are not essential to a
determination that an organization is an association taxable as a cor-
poration. Thus, it is not necessary for the holders of the beneficial in-
terests to have control over the operation of the business, as it is in
the case of a corporation. Furthermore, the absence of particular cor-
porate forms or of the usual terminology of the corporations is not de-
terminative. In the three companion cases, the Court pointed out other
features which would not be necessary, such as: operations may be
limited to one project, as a single oil lease20 or an apartment house ;21
no meetings need be held or records kept ;22 the organization need not
have an office, by-laws, or seal; and the number of beneficiaries may be
small.23
Court Cases Since Morrissey
Although the Commissioner has spent much recent effort drafting
regulations which, if upheld by the courts, might deny corporate tax
status to professional organizations, he has for many years been suc-
cessfully enforcing corporate tax status against reluctant taxpayers in
many other cases. Apparently, his left arm does not know what his right
arm is doing. It is easy to understand that with a staff such as he has,
members of one section do not have much communication with or in-
fluence on members of another section.
In 1938, the Commissioner was upheld in claiming corporate tax
status in Thrash Lease Trust v. Commissioner,2 4 where the taxpayers
claimed that they had an ordinary trust holding an oil and gas lease.
There, transferable percentage interests were sold to many persons. The
trust's business was personally conducted by the trustee's father, while
the drilling operations were conducted by the trustee. There were no
meetings of interest holders, no by-laws, no officers, and no written
agreement defining the rights and interests of parties; nor were the
interest holders expected to be liable for obligations other than the costs
of drilling a second well. The Court held that the organization's general
structure and method of operation were sufficiently analogous to a cor-
porate organization to justify the Commissioner in taxing its income
as that of a corporation.
IS Treas. Reg. § 301.7701 (1960).
19 Swanson v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 362 (1935); Helvering v. Combs, 296
U.S. 365 (1935); Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert Associates, 296 U.S. 369(1935).
20 Helvering v. Combs, supra note 19.
21 Swanson v. Commissioner, supra note 19.
22 Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert Associates, supra note 19.
23 Helvering v. Combs, supra note 19.
2499 F. 2d 925 (9th Cir. 1938).
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In 1940 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
in Kettleman Hills Royalty Syndicate No. 1 v. Commissioner,25 found
corporate tax status under similar facts, saying: "It is our opinion that
in making these successive decisions whether it will require the delivery
of the royalty product in kind or in cash, the taxpayer is making a suc-
cession of business judgments and 'is doing business' within the de-
cision of Morrissey v. Commissioner, . . . though through the tax years
in question it thought it better business to accept cash rather than the
oil products.1
26
In 1942, another trust was held taxable as a corporation in Porter v.
Commissioner 2 7 on similar facts.
The Ninth Circuit dealt with still another trust arrangement in Helm
& Smith Syndicate v. Commissioner28 in 1943. In its opinion, the court
held that limitation of a beneficiary's liability is not a sine qua non of
corporate tax status:
In the first period we have an association of investors with a
management by a committee of five persons acting as do a board
of directors, with provision for continuing of the directing body
as in corporations. The committee's function was not one of mere
conversation of assets but of the usual leasing, selling and man-
aging of petroleum properties of any of the oil owning and leas-
ing corporations. As with stockholders there was a provision for
the transfer of the beneficial interests in the continuing associ-
ative enterprise.
2 9
In Fletcher v. Clark3 0 the Tenth Circuit examined another trust. The
organization did not mine or own mining equipment. It did not have by-
laws, seal, minutes, officers, employees, or meetings of owners of bene-
ficial interests. Nor did the trust agreement provide for limitation of
personal liability. The court reviewed the usual criteria of corporate
status as laid down in Morrissey and stated that each of these indices
were not an unyielding rule of thumb. "Each case must be decided by
reference to its own peculiar facts, particularly whether the undertaking
bears a fair resemblance to corporations."
3 1
There were similar facts and a similar holding in Nee v. Main
Street Bank.3 2 There the Eighth Circuit found the resemblance to corp-
orations supportive, but not in invariable form. "It implies merely the ex-
istence of characteristics in its written structure or in its adopted mode
-25 116 F. 2d 382 (9th Cir. 1940).
_6 Id. at 383.
27 130 F. 2d 276 (9th Cir. 1942).
28 136 F. 2d 440 (9th Cir. 1943).
291d. at 441.
30 150 F. 2d 239 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 763, rehearing denied, 326
U.S. 809 (1945), 166 A.L.R. 1456.
31Id. at 240.
32 174 F. 2d 425 (8th Cir. 1949).
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of operation that remind patterningly of a corporate organization, though
not identical therewith." 33
The Sixth Circuit reached the same result with a trust holding a
real estate lease in Main Hammond Land Trust Co. v. Commissioner.3 4
Here the court deemed the business purpose for which the trust was
organized of great significance. Another important factor was the trans-
ferability of beneficial interests.
The Tax Court threw a considerable amount of light on the subject
in John Province #1 Well, 35 upholding the Commissioner's determina-
tion that the taxpayers who owned fractional interests in the rights to
profits from certain gas wells were associations taxable as corporations.
In this case, the grounds for the decisions were as follows: An organi-
zation need not be identical with a corporation to be so taxed, but need
only resemble a corporation. The taxpayers had a common purpose to
carry on a business for profit, and the assignees constituted associates.
Centralized management existed because the assignor reserved to him-
self all managerial functions. Continuity of existence was present, since
the record discloses that death and transfers occurred without demon-
strable effect. Centralization of legal title and limited liability might
not be present in the strict sense. However, the powers retained by the
assignor were the equivalent of absolute ownership, and it is apparent
that there was a purpose to limit the liability of the investors to the
amount originally contributed to the enterprise. There was a provision
in the agreement that no partnership was intended, and this was re-
garded as an attempt to limit liability.
The Third Circuit affirmed this tax court decision,3 pointing out in
its opinion that the interests were specifically designated as tenancies
in common and not as a partnership. There were inter vivos transfers
of fractional interest from time to time without interrupting the business
or necessitating any reorganization. There was no identification by
name, telephone listing, officers, or articles of association beyond the
assignee-manager's records of allocations of costs and income.
The Medical Clinic Cases
These cases have been so often referred to that one fears that to
review them again would be mere redundancy. However, since the
Commissioner's proposed regulations are inconsistent with them, an-
other review is necessary to indicate that this is so. The most cele-
brated case is Kintner v. United States,37 decided by the Ninth Circuit
in 1954.
331d. at 431.
34200 F. 2d 308 (6th Cir. 1952).
3537 T. C. 376 (1961).
36 John Provence #1 Well v. Commissioner, 321 F. 2d 840 (3d Cir. 1963).
37216 F. 2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
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In Kintner, a group of doctors dissolved their partnership and trans-
ferred its assets to the "Western Montana Clinic," an association which
was to continue until the death of the last survivor of the original
members. The articles provided for both junior and senior members
and that the business affairs were to be managed by an executive com-
mittee consisting of five men elected by the senior members. Member-
ship was limited to physicians and surgeons licensed to practice medi-
cine in the state of Montana. It was provided that only the members
were to be liable to third parties for professional misconduct, and that
any indebtedness incurred by the association through the act of a mem-
ber, without approval of the executive committee, was chargeable to
the member concerned. Furthermore, the articles provided that the death
or retirement of a member would not result in dissolution of the asso-
ciation and that beneficial interests of members were non-assignable
except by complying with restrictions. It was conceded by the court
that the personal liability features more closely resembled a partnership
than a corporation. In its decision, the court concluded that the or-
ganization more closely resembled a corporation than a partnership and
that it should be taxed as a corporation. It stated that not all of the
tests stated in the Morrissey decisions must be met in each instance.
In 1936, the Seventh Circuit held in Pelton v. Commissioner 8 that
a business trust entered into by a group of Illinois doctors was taxable
as a corporation. The doctors transferred certain equipment to them-
selves as trustees and issued beneficial interest certificates which rep-
resented transferable shares subject to options to purchase given to
other beneficiaries before they could be sold to outsiders. The bene-
ficiaries were given the power to fill vacancies among the trustees. Upon
the death of a beneficiary, his beneficial interest passed to his wife or
other relative subject, however, to the repurchase option by the trustees
or other beneficiaries. The trust was to last for ten years, after which
all assets would be distributed to the beneficiaries.
A district court in Texas found the "Southwest Medical Clinic
Association" taxable as a corporation in Galt v. United States" where
the facts were very similar to Pelton. However, in Gait, upon retiring,
an associate would receive one year's salary, apparently in lieu of his
capital interest.
The most recent case is Foreman v. United States,4" decided April
2, 1964. Here two doctors who had been partners formed an association
on June 1, 1960. On October 11, 1960, a third doctor was employed
under an agreement which set out the usual conditions of employment.
On the same day, the doctors entered into a separate agreement whereby
3882 F. 2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936).
39 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959).40 232 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Fla. 1964).
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the two members of the association agreed to transfer a portion of
their respective ownership interests to the newly employed doctor an-
nually during his employment so that after five years he would become
a one-third owner.
The association had articles of association which provided for per-
petual existence, voting by members in proportion to percentage of
ownership, annual meetings, and a board of governors to manage its
business and affairs.
Upon death or retirement, neither the associate nor his personal
representative had any interest in or right to withdraw any portion of
the assets. However, the associates or his personal representative could
transfer his ownership interest provided that the association and other
associates had first option to buy such interest.
The articles of association further provided that it would not be
dissolved by death, resignation, insolvency, bankruptcy, removal, or
retirement of an associate. Assets of the partnership amounting to
$209,000 (the bulk of which constituted accounts receivable) were
transferred to the association, apparently in a non-taxable exchange
under section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
The Government contended that since physicians cannot legally
form a corporation for the practice of medicine in Florida, the associ-
ation, regardless of how many tests it might meet, could never have the
requisite substantial resemblance to a corporation required under the
federal statute. Judge Choate pointed out that this argument was made
by the Government in the Kintner and Galt cases, and also in the Pelton
case, and was rejected by the court in each.
The Government also contended that a medical association largely
obtains its income from personal services and thus does not earn the
kind of income normally earned by a corporation. This contention is
similar to the reasoning in the proposed regulations. However, it did
not impress the court, which said in respect thereto:
The fallacy of this argument is readily apparent when one
considers the large number of corporations presently existing in
our economy whose primary income is earned solely from the
personal services of their employees. The corporate tax status
of businesses engaged in advertising or promotion, investigation,
sales, contract janitorial or secretarial service, to name a few,
has not been seriously questioned to the Court's knowledge. 41
The court concluded that on the established precedents, judgment
must be rendered finding corporate tax status for tax purposes. The
case did not discuss the Kintner regulations or the proposed additions.
41Id. at 137.
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Conclusions
From these cases we can rather positively determine the character-
istics that make an organization taxable as a corporation. These are:
1. Separate entity. This probably is a result of other characteristics;
nevertheless, either a professional service corporation or a trust does
constitute an entity separate from its members. We believe that a pro-
fessional association also has this characteristic even though it does not
get a charter from a governmental body.
2. Purpose to carry on a business for profit. The new regulations,
either proposed or adopted, do not seem to raise any problem here.
3. Associates. If regarded as absolutely necessary, this would make
it difficult for the one-man firms to qualify. However, there are very
many one-shareholder, "ordinary business" corporations, even in service
industries. We doubt that this attribute should always be insisted upon
because, after all, a partner always has associates. No question as to
the number of members was raised in the Foreman case, as the associ-
ation started out with two associates and then added a third a few
months later.
4. Title to property held in the name of the entity.
5. General structure and method of operation substantially resem-
bling that of a corporation. The Morrissey decisions 42 set out the char-
acteristics which generally indicate substantial resemblance:
a. Centralized management. This involves some sort of a
board of directors, board of governors, or board of trustees,
who set general policy that is carried out by officers. This does
not mean that the directors must concern themselves with details
of operation such as the treatment of individual patients by indi-
vidual doctors.
43
b. Continuity of life. This requires that the existence of the
entity is not affected by the death, resignation, insolvency, bank-
ruptcy, or retirement of an owner. The fact that there are agree-
ments providing for repurchase of such an individual's equity
upon the occurence of such an event does not affect the continu-
ity of the entity.
c. Transferability of interests. This is more or less the other
side of continuity of life. However, if the organization structure
is not affected by the transfer of an equity interest, the fact that
such transfers are subject to options to repurchase by the or-
ganization or other equity owners should not affect the tax status
of the organization. This procedure is followed almost as a mat-
ter of course in respect to most small close corporations.
d. Limited liability. This is a corporate characteristic that has
been restricted in cases of some "ordinary business" corporations.
The fact that the limitation on personal liability is only partial
42 See cases cited notes 15 and 19 supra.4 Spec. Rul., CCH 1961 STAND. FED. TAx. REP. 56375 (March 2, 1961).
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should not cause the organization to be taxed other than as a
corporation.
44
The court decisions delineate many features and practices which are
seldom considered characteristic of corporations but which, if present, do
not prevent taxation of the organization as a corporation. These in-
clude: limitation of operations to one project such as a single oil lease
or an apartment house; failure to hold meetings or keep records; lack
of an office, by-laws, or seal; and a small number of beneficiaries. 45
Prognosis
This might best be designated as "sticking out one's neck." Never-
theless a client is entitled to have his attorney-advisor indicate to him
what the attorney's informed opinion is as to how the law will develop.
Consequently, we are setting down our opinion of what we think clients
can expect:
1. The Foreman case is entirely consistent with prior decisions. We
believe that future decisions will continue along the same line.
2. We believe that it will be easier to convince a court that the pro-
posed regulations in their original form are invalid, than it would be
if they were modified to come closer to the law. Only a slight departure
from court decisions might be rationalized as a reasonable interpreta-
tion of the court's opinion. Radical departures are much easier to recog-
nize and for the courts to overturn.
3. Since there are many clients and their attorneys who do not wish
to depend upon litigation to establish their tax status as corporations,
statutory relief is desirable. This has been initiated and has resulted in
the introduction of two bills48 into Congress which would amend section
7701(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to include "professional
associations formed under state law" within the definition of organiza-
tions taxable as corporations. This amendment will not clarify the tax
status of professional corporations except by indirection. It seems to
us that more certainty could be obtained by including within the defini-
tion of corporations "any organization which receives a certificate of
organization or charter from a state and which has existence separate
from its members."
44WIs. STAT. § 180.40(6) provides that the shareholders of every corporation,
other than railroad corporations, shall be personally liable to an amount
equal to the issue value (par value in use of par value shares or considera-
tion when issued as no par shares) of shares. for debts owing employees for
services performed for not more than six months. Section 200.06 provides
that the Commissioner of Insurance can order an insurance corporation to
restore its capital by assessments on its shareholders. It is apparent that in
Wisconsin the "unlimited" liability of shareholders of "ordinary" business
corporations is not in fact "unlimited."
45See cases cited note 19 supra.
46 S. 2403, H.R. 9217, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
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4. The proposed regulations do suggest some points to consider in
drafting articles of organization and where state statutes could be
amended. For example, section 180.99(8) of the Wisconsin statutes
provides that the legal relationships between a person receiving profes-
sional services and persons rendering such services who are sharehold-
ers, resulting in legal liabilities, shall be joint and several as is the case
in partnerships. However, this does not apply to liability arising out
of actions of employees who are not shareholders. This was included
in the statute because the sponsors believed that it would make it easier
for the legislature to accept the law. It might have been better to retain
,ordinary" corporate liabilities and insist that the organization be re-
quired to carry a reasonable amount of professional liability insurance
coverage.
A careful reading of the proposed regulations will be a helpful
guide to the alert attorney. In drafting articles of organization, it would
be well to exclude any provisions that spell out restrictions on trans-
ferability or ownership of the stock. The proposed regulations seem to
make inclusions of such restrictions in the articles of organization an
important factor in determining corporate tax status. Such corporate
status is not denied where merely included in agreements adopted by
the equity owners themselves, as is the case with so many small "ordi-
nary" business corporations. 47 Furthermore, one would be prudent to
exclude any provisions which spell out what happens upon the death
or termination of employment of shareholders, or what happens upon
disqualification to hold stock, as when an attorney is elected to a ju-
dicial office. The same objective can be obtained by use of employment
contracts and buy and sell agreements. The regulations apparently recog-
nize a distinction in this respect.
5. Attorneys might well advise their clients to use the common law
trust procedure such as is set out in section 226.14 of the Wisconsin
statutes, rather than the professional corporation statute, section 180.99.
Since the Wisconsin professional corporation law gives authority to
practice the professions in the corporate form, no ethical problem
should be encountered in the use of the common law trust. The ad-
vantage is that section 226.14 contains no restrictions on ownership or
transferability in that statute itself. If these are incorporated only in
employment agreements and buy and sell agreements rather than in
the articles of organization, the entity should meet the requirements of
the proposed regulations as well as existing law. Furthermore, Flecher's
Corporation Service and Nichols Forms cite authority to the effect that
if the governing trustees of a common law trust are not elected by the
17 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (b) (2).
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equity owners, the limited liability of the equity owners will be rec-
ognized.
The Challenge
We believe that there is a responsibility on the part of attorneys to
take an active part in the development of the law in this area. Passive
acceptance of or failure to object to the Treasury's insistence of non-
corporate tax status of these types of organizations permits legislation
by bureaucracy. The Treasury's position is based on the grounds of
"protecting the revenue." This is no substitute for substantially equal
treatment of taxpayers in substantially similar situations. We need more
attorneys who are willing to do their part in righting wrongs. Even the
professional man, though well compensated, has the right to equitable
treatment.
